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Preface 
 
The following report provides information and analysis to aid Californians as they consider whether 
and how to change their process for drawing electoral district lines. It reviews the overarching goals 
of redistricting efforts and describes how the membership, structure and instructions given to an 
Independent Redistricting Commission can be crafted to help it achieve these goals. It also evaluates 
three main proposals for Independent Redistricting Commissions and discusses how their best features 
can be combined and improved to create a Commission that will be both fair and effective for 
California’s voters. The Center for Governmental Studies and Demos have prepared Drawing Lines in 
an attempt to inform policy makers, advocates and the media about how such a proposal might look. 
 
 
Center for Governmental Studies  
 
The Center for Governmental Studies (CGS) creates innovative political and media solutions to help 
individuals participate more effectively in their communities and governments. CGS uses research, 
advocacy, information technology and education to improve the fairness of governmental policies and 
processes, empower the underserved to participate more effectively in their communities, improve 
communication between voters and candidates for office, and help implement effective public policy 
reforms. CGS identifies governance, social and economic problems, conducts in-depth studies, and 
proposes solutions. CGS then works with government agencies and community organizations to 
implement solutions by drafting new laws, regulations, improved procedures, and designing 
technological systems.  
 
Demos: A Network for Ideas & Action  
 
Demos is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy research and advocacy organization. Demos’ 
Democracy Program supports the creation of a diverse, inclusive and national movement for far-
reaching state and federal democracy reform. We strengthen reform efforts by linking democracy 
advocates and campaigns with their counterparts in other states, developing and advancing a broad 
agenda for reform, and producing both applied research products and new research on long-range 
trends that will alter the shape of American democracy in the 21st century. 
 
James Irvine Foundation  
 
This report has been made possible through generous funding from The James Irvine Foundation. The 
Irvine Foundation is a private, nonprofit grantmaking foundation, with offices in San Francisco and 
Los Angeles. The Irvine Foundation is not responsible, however, for the findings and 
recommendations in this study. 
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Executive Summary  
 
In California’s 2004 legislative and congressional elections, every incumbent running for reelection 
won and no seats changed party hands. This lack of competition is due significantly to the 
legislature’s decision to redraw electoral districts to protect incumbents against challengers. When the 
deck is so stacked against competition, the public loses.  
 
There are currently several California legislative bills and initiatives proposing to strip the legislature 
of the power to draw new districts and give it to an Independent Redistricting Commission. While 
redistricting should be conducted by a Commission, our analysis suggests that none of the various 
proposals under current consideration does enough to encourage the creation of more competitive 
districts or to improve representation of minorities, the two areas where California is most in need of 
improvement.  
 
The public interest can be better served by amending these proposals to comply with the following 
public interest goals: insulating the redistricting process from legislative control; performing 
redistricting only once a decade; protecting minority influence in a judicious manner; increasing the 
number of close contests between candidates from different political parties; and ensuring that no 
party can capture and unfairly exert influence on the redistricting process.  
 
Proposed Measures  
One significant ballot initiative and two significant legislative reform proposals have recently been 
introduced to reform the state’s redistricting process – Ted Costa’s ballot initiative (currently in 
circulation for signatures), ACAX1 3 (McCarthy, R-Bakersfield), which is supported by Governor 
Schwarzenegger, and SCA 3 (Lowenthal, D-Long Beach). These proposals have provoked an 
important discussion and shined a spotlight on California’s flawed redistricting process.  
 
Recommended Commission Features 
An Independent Redistricting Commission must have the following key features: 
 
1. Membership  
• The Commission should include: nine retired judges and other citizens; three Commissioners 
from each major party and three Commissioners from neither major party; and a membership 
that reflects California’s diversity.  
• There should be restrictions on previous and future political activities – such as running for 
partisan public office, lobbying, and working for a candidate’s campaign – to ensure unbiased 
decision-making.   
 
2. Selection Process  
• The Judicial Council should select a pool of 36 potential Commissioners.  
• The pool should reflect the racial diversity of California, have equal numbers of men and 
women, and include six retired judges registered with each major party, six citizens registered 
with each major party as well as six retired judges and six citizens registered with neither 
major party. 
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• The four legislative leaders should each have two preemptory vetoes on individuals in the 
candidate pool.  
• A random process should be used to select nine Commissioners from the candidate pool. This 
process should also ensure fulfillment of diversity and partisan equality membership 
requirements.  
 
3. Criteria  
• All districts must be: equal in population according to federal standards, contiguous, nested,1 
compliant with the Voting Rights Act and other federal law, and neutral with respect to 
political parties, incumbents and other candidates.  
• The Commission’s additional objectives, in priority order, should be: full representation of 
racial and ethnic minorities, more competitive districts, respecting identifiable communities of 
interest, conforming to geographic and political lines to the extent practicable, and creating 
compact districts.  
 
4. Transparency and Public Accountability  
• All meetings and hearings should be public, with adequate notice given.  
• Hearings should occur (i) before the Commission begins drawing maps, (ii) after an initial 
map is proposed, (iii) after any significant revisions are made to the draft maps and (iv) after 
the Final Plan is proposed.  
• Redistricting information, expertise and tools should be provided on-site for use by individuals 
and organizations as soon as relevant information is available, and all proposed full or partial 
maps and agenda items should be posted to a web site one week before a meeting or hearing. 
• The Commission must comply with the Bagley-Keane Act. No legislative privilege should be 
exercised or ex parte communication allowed (except between Commissioners and staff, who 
still must make public their communications once the Final Plan has been proposed).   
• Independent experts should evaluate how well Commission-created draft maps comply with 
listed criteria, and the Commission should itself issue a report when releasing its Final Plan 
explaining how it met all the criteria. 
 
5. Implementation and Review:  
• The state shoud be redistricted once every ten years, respecting traditional decennial 
redistricting principles. 
• The Commission must be guaranteed sufficient resources to enact a plan and defend it in 
court.  
• The Final Plan should be reviewable directly by the California Supreme Court. 
 
 
We compare the major features of each proposal to those of our Ideal Plan below (and provide a 
more detailed description and analysis in the Appendix). While the Lowenthal proposal appears to 
provide the best starting point for an Independent Redistricting Commission, it is not yet optimal. In 
light of the current proposals’ weaknesses, we advise amending all of the proposals to incorporate the 
public interest recommendations in this report.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Nested so that Board of Equalization districts are comprised of ten adjacent State Senate districts, and each Senate 
district is comprised of two adjacent Assembly districts.  
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Comparative Analysis: 
 Lowenthal McCarthy  Costa Ideal Plan  
1. Are major parties guaranteed equal representation on 
Commission? 
 
Yes No No Yes 
2. Is the Commission instructed to make districts more 
competitive? 
 
Yes  Yes No Yes 
3. Is the Commission given the data and instructions necessary 
to make significantly more competitive districts likely? 
 
No No No Yes 
4. Is Voting Rights Act compliance explicitly required and 
prioritized? 
 
Yes No Yes Yes 
5. Is the Commission likely to reflect California’s diversity? 
 
Maybe No No Yes 
6. Is the Commission prohibited from using incumbent 
residence when drawing districts? 
 
Yes No Yes Yes 
7. Are all Commission meetings required to be open to the 
public? 
 
Yes No Yes Yes 
8. Must most of the Commission’s data and documents be 
made public? 
 
Yes No Yes Yes 
9. Will the “once a decade” redistricting rule be maintained? 
 
Yes No No Yes 
       10.   Will the Commission’s proposals be implemented without 
requiring an additional legislative or popular vote? 
Yes Yes No Yes 
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Introduction  
 
California, like the rest of the country, has experienced a steady decline in the competitiveness of its 
congressional and state legislative electoral districts. In 2004, incumbents won every congressional 
and state election in which they ran, and only six of the state legislature’s 100 races were truly 
competitive (a margin-of-victory of 10% or less.) Governor Schwarzenegger recently called a special 
legislative session to consider the adoption of an Independent Redistricting Commission to replace the 
legislature as the author of new legislative and congressional districts. 
 
Experts cite redistricting – the process of drawing new district lines to determine which residents will 
be grouped together when electing representatives – as one of the causes of the declining number of 
competitive elections and, in some cases, of inequitable partisan legislative representation. The 
process, which usually takes place after each decennial census, is by its nature politically 
controversial. Many redistricting plans are met with charges that the revised congressional or state 
legislative districts – which are routinely gerrymandered into improbable shapes and sizes – are too 
partisan, too friendly to incumbents, not competitive enough and unrepresentative of minority 
populations.  The courts are often drawn into the disputes when elected leaders (and electors) cannot 
agree and are forced to draw district lines themselves. When elected leaders choose their own 
constituencies instead of the reverse, it severely limits the power of the vote. Despite these 
drawbacks, most state legislatures still draw both congressional and state legislative districts 
themselves, but alternatives to this method are now being considered by a wide variety of individuals, 
public officials and public interest groups.  
 
In recent months, several ballot initiatives and legislative bills have been introduced in California, all 
seeking to remove the legislature’s power to implement redistricting. The approach proposed in all of 
these measures is to transfer responsibility from the legislature to an Independent Redistricting 
Commission. Proponents argue that a Commission will help eliminate some of the more egregious 
redistricting problems, thereby increasing representation, competitiveness and partisan fairness. 
Independent Redistricting Commissions have had mixed success overall, with some states 
experiencing increases in partisan fairness and competitiveness. A window of opportunity is opening 
for Californians to reflect on the problematic outcome of the current redistricting process and 
carefully consider what kind of proposal would be necessary to improve the next round of 
redistricting. 
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Section 1: Overarching Goals of Independent Redistricting  
 
Californians tend to live in pockets of racial and political homogeneity, requiring any process for 
designing new single-member districts to balance its objectives. California’s current residential 
patterns would lead most compact districts to be politically “safe” for one political party. To produce 
more than modest gains in the number of competitive districts, district lines would have to cut across 
cities, suburbs, and surrounding areas, which might, in turn, hinder the ability of minority 
communities to gain fair representation.  
 
Alternative voting systems, such as multi-member districts with proportional or cumulative voting,2 
could lessen the need for such dramatic trade-offs by allowing for meaningful competition in areas 
where one racial group or political party is dominant.3 Regardless of whether a Commission is 
allowed to design such multi-member districts, clarifying the relative importance of redistricting 
criteria is a fundamental first step of redistricting in the public interest. This report postulates minority 
representation, competitiveness and partisan fairness as key objectives that must be encouraged and 
balanced in a successful redistricting plan.   
 
Minority Representation 
 
A second important objective is ensuring that minority interests are properly represented by elected 
leaders. Redistricting has been used – both historically and recently – to crack minority  communities 
into multiple districts, pack a larger community into a single district or otherwise dilute minority 
voting strength.  The Voting Rights Act, passed in 1965, provides federal protection to traditionally 
disenfranchised minority communities to address dilution through redistricting. Different benchmarks 
for measuring successful efforts to increase minority representation have been used, including the 
number of effective majority-minority districts, the number of elected leaders of a particular race or 
ethnicity, and the number of districts with significant minority influence or likely multi-racial alliances 
capable of electing leaders who will be responsive to minority interests. Regardless of the measure, it 
is important to prioritize respect for the Voting Rights Act as an important redistricting criterion in 
drawing proposed district maps. 
 
Those who draw the district lines are often asked to respect “communities of interest,” which may 
include communities defined by shared socio-economic, ethnic, geographic, economic or other 
interests. The Supreme Court has accepted varying definitions of “communities of interest” and the 
criteria are seldom defined by local legislatures.  Fair redistricting should engage traditionally 
underrepresented communities in drawing lines that do not result in the dilution of their voting 
strength and that respect defined communities of interest.  Communities of interest should not be 
used as pretexts to justify district boundaries that do not further these and other legitimate objectives. 
 
                                                 
2 Although federal law requires single-member districts for congressional races, California could adopt such districts 
for the legislature. For illustrative congressional maps, see http://www.fairvote.org/pr/super/2004/california.htm.  
3 Lani Guinier, “No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality,” 77 Va. L. Rev. 1413, 1489 (1991). 
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Competitive Districts 
 
Electoral competition is a basic requirement of democratic accountability in representative 
government. In most states, legislators can draw legislative and congressional district lines after each 
decennial census that will, to a significant extent, ensure their own reelection. Without competition 
from candidates of opposing parties, representatives become less responsive to their constituents, less 
subject to public criticism and scrutiny and more likely to defend more extreme liberal or conservative 
positions. Competition also helps to foster elected leaders that are more responsive to all of the 
interests, including those of racial and ethnic minorities, within their districts. 
 
Civic groups, editorial boards and elected officials who support the use of an Independent 
Redistricting Commission hope to thwart both the adoption of increasingly uncompetitive districts and 
the machinations of state legislators attempting to lock-in the benefits of one-time electoral swings by 
drawing new district lines that virtually guarantee permanent party dominance, irrespective of the 
popular will. Although the state’s lawmakers have not elected to maximize the number of districts in 
which the majority party has the advantage, they have drawn districts that ensure very few 
competitive general elections for incumbents of both parties. This “incumbent’s agreement” is 
perhaps the most frequently cited by those calling for an Independent Redistricting Commission. 
 
 
Partisan Fairness  
 
In theory, the aggregate party membership of an elected political body should roughly reflect the 
party preferences of those they represent. Therefore, a 60% share of the average districts votes should 
translate (roughly) to a 60% share of legislative seats.4 In practice, however, this is often not the case. 
While not the only explanation available, redistricting may contribute a great deal to such imbalances. 
A party can use its power to manipulate the redistricting process, thus garnering a disproportionate 
number of representative seats when compared to the party preferences of the underlying population. 
The degree to which this can occur depends on many factors: who redistricts; what criteria are used; 
which party holds the governorship and the legislature; the composition and views of the judiciary; 
and, the power of the electorate, interest groups and opposition parties. 
 
While both static (geographic and political boundaries) and dynamic (population and changing 
partisan identification) features make it impossible to ensure that single-member districts result in 
perfect partisan representation, a neutral, unbiased process would at least guarantee that neither party 
would benefit more than another party if the situation were flipped.  
 
Inspiring Public Confidence 
 
Once established, Commissions must operate in a manner that gives the public full confidence in the 
fairness and openness of their procedures and transparency in the reasoning of Commissioners. In 
general, the ideal Independent Redistricting Commission should have strong requirements to open all 
meetings to the public, to publish all data and other documentation and to hold public hearings 
throughout the state.   
 
                                                 
4 Since 100% of a district’s representation is given to candidates with even a small majority, the partisan leanings of 
the electorate tend to be magnified. For example: a 60% share of the vote may translate into a 65% seat share.   
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The complicated and highly controversial nature of the redistricting process requires that it be 
undertaken carefully. Although public interest groups and the public in general should be heard 
during the Commission’s deliberations, a referendum on the final redistricting plan would be difficult 
to conduct in a manner that allowed the average voter to be fully informed of the complexities of 
various district maps. The redistricting process should respect the “once a decade” precedent in order 
to avoid more frequent partisan efforts to alter redistricting outcomes.  
 
“Traditional” Redistricting Criteria 
 
Some traditional redistricting criteria, such as equal population, are important in their own right.  
Drawing districts that have equal populations ensures all voters have votes of the same weight in 
electing legislators. 5 
 
Requirements that districts be compact, on the other hand, are valuable primarily because they make 
it more difficult for line-drawers to enact racial or partisan gerrymanders or bipartisan incumbent-
protection plans. Critics of these plans point to irregularly-shaped districts not because they are 
inherently problematic, but as evidence of efforts to benefit or harm political parties, particular racial 
or ethnic groups, or certain incumbents or other candidates. In order for compactness to effectively 
guard against such plans, it must be defined more precisely than the often-used instruction that “a 
contiguous area of population shall not be bypassed to incorporate an area of population more 
distant.”6  
 
Other requirements, such as contiguity and “nesting” of adjacent assembly districts within each senate 
district and adherence to county and municipal boundaries, are valuable in part because they reduce 
the scope of possible gerrymandering, but also because they simplify political participation for voters. 
Similarly, requiring districts not to cross municipal or county boundaries helps keep natural 
constituencies intact, allows voters to more easily hold their elected officials accountable, and may 
encourage representatives to be more responsive to their constituencies.   
 
Although equal population, contiguity, and nesting districts should be required in order to enable 
citizens to have equal votes and to more easily identify their district, compactness and other related 
traditional redistricting requirements should be relaxed when necessary to ensure competitive and 
representative districts. Deviations from county and municipal boundaries and “compactness” should 
be allowed if they advance other specified objectives, but also be closely scrutinized to avoid more 
problematic gerrymandering attempts.7 
 
                                                 
5 The “one person, one vote” standard for equality is mandated under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  The standard for state legislatures (established by a series of U.S. Supreme 
Court cases) is the following: plans where the overall deviation between the least populated and most populated 
districts is 10% or less are presumed legitimate; if the deviation is above 10%, the state must prove a compelling 
state interest requiring the deviation. The standard for Congressional districts is stricter, requiring a deviation of less 
than 1%.  
6 ACAX1 3, Sec 2(c). 
7 One possible way to aid this scrutiny would be to require the Commission to create an initial grid-like district map 
according to a precise mathematical formula for equal population and compactness, so that departures from the 
initial grid could be clearly identified and the extent to which they serve other specified objectives could be 
evaluated. 
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Section 2: Lessons from Other Independent Commissions 
 
Arizona, Iowa, New Jersey, and Washington State (the four states that use Commissions to design 
both congressional and state legislative districts) achieved some success in their most recent attempts 
to create district lines that ensure fair minority representation and partisan fairness, but they have 
failed to achieve significant gains in the number of competitive districts. In general, bipartisan 
Commissions often succeed in creating districts that do not allow one party to win significantly more 
seats than its average statewide support, but do not necessarily achieve the other objectives. Demos is 
preparing a detailed analysis of how Commissions of various kinds have performed throughout the 
country for a forthcoming report; preliminary evaluation of Commissions in other states is outlined 
below and is the basis for many of the recommendations outlined in the Section 3. 
 
Arizona adopted a Commission most recently and serves as the model for Lowenthal’s recent 
California Commission proposal. It is therefore instructive to examine and learn from Arizona’s recent 
redistricting experience.  
 
Competitive Districts 
 
In Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,8 
the Maricopa County Superior Court found that the Commission improperly deemphasized 
competitiveness as an objective, decreased the competitiveness of districts in the course of applying 
each of the other redistricting criteria to the original grid-like maps, and improperly interpreted 
competitiveness as the “‘least important’ of the redistricting criteria and subordinate to the other 
redistricting criteria.” The Court further found that the Commission “adopted its Final Draft Map 
without even considering, let alone favoring, competitiveness” even though the printed arguments in 
favor of the proposition creating the Commission “emphasized that a primary purpose of Proposition 
106 was to insure the creation of competitive congressional and legislative districts.”  
 
Unlike Arizona’s Proposition 106, the Lowenthal proposal explicitly prioritizes the objectives for 
redistricting and, in its current form, ranks competitiveness last. Even without relying on language 
that so explicitly deemphasized competitiveness, the districts created by the Arizona Commission did 
in fact result in fewer competitive districts in 2002 and 2004 than in the 2000 elections. In fact, the 
pattern of decreasing competition during those elections in Arizona and the decreasing competition in 
California look remarkably similar. To avoid a similar failure in California, advocates of increased 
district competitiveness should insist that it be a more highly valued objective.  
 
The following chart shows how four states that already used a Commission in their last redistricting 
had almost as much of a reduction as California in the percentage of legislative districts that were 
even mildly competitive (won by 20 percentage points or fewer). In Arizona’s case, the drop in 
competitive districts was even larger than California’s. This suggests that Commissions, without 
explicit instructions to define and prioritize competitiveness as a redistricting objective, are unlikely to 
achieve significant gains in the number of competitive districts. 
 
                                                 
8 Available at http://azredistricting.org/2004legfinal/2004LegCourtOrder.pdf. 
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Competitive Legislative Elections Before and After Redistricting
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Arizona’s Commission may have created more competitive districts if it had been given (or asked to 
adopt early in the process) specific definitions of “communities of interest” and other redistricting 
criteria. In Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting, the Court found that: 
 
The Commission never voted to adopt any objective criteria to determine the 
existence of a ‘community of interest’… Instead, each Commissioner individually and 
subjectively determined, based on public testimony or an individual Commissioner’s 
personal knowledge, whether a “community of interest” existed in a particular area… 
The reasons cited by Commissioners for not favoring the creation of competitive 
districts and particularly the Hall-Minkoff Plan were pretextual and did not amount to 
a finding of significant detriment. 
 
Forcing Commissioners to spell out their rationale for preferring one set of districts over another 
explicitly (rather than allowing them to claim, of competitiveness or communities of interest, that they 
“know it when they see it”) can limit the opportunity for creating districts that are uncompetitive or 
favor one political party or incumbent over another. 
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Minority Representation 
 
Although the percentage of elected leaders of a particular race or ethnicity is only one way of 
measuring how well minorities are represented, the available data suggest that California already has 
a more representative legislature than many states with Independent Redistricting Commissions and 
that further improvement is likely to require that the membership and objectives of a Commission are 
carefully designed to make such improvements more likely. 
 
Although the percentage of Latinos in both California and Arizona’s legislature continue to lag behind 
the percentage of Latinos in each state’s adult population, redistricting in both states contributed to 
shrinking this gap. In other states with Commissions, however, Latinos won the same number of 
legislative seats (and comprised an effective majority in the same number of legislative districts) after 
redistricting as they did before. The percentage of African American legislators, on the other hand, 
remained constant in California and Arizona, while increasing somewhat in the other sample states 
with Commissions.9 Too few Asian Americans lived in the sample states with Commissions to 
meaningfully compare their lack of legislative representation in those states and in California. 
 
Partisan Fairness 
 
The biggest success of Independent Redistricting Commissions has been their ability to create districts 
that treat both major political parties fairly. In general, a redistricting process that ignores partisan 
concerns will tend to create districts that magnify the partisan leanings of the electorate into a 
somewhat more lopsided legislature. This is inherent to the nature of single-member districts, which 
give 100% of a district’s representation to candidates who sometimes win only a small majority or 
plurality of the district’s votes. Chart 4 compares the percentage of major party votes the Democratic 
candidate received in the average legislative district10 in the election that preceded redistricting to the 
percentage of legislative seats the Democrats won in that election; Chart 5 makes the same 
comparison for the most recent legislative elections after redistricting. 
 
Chart 4 shows that, prior to redistricting, Democrats in California received 58% of the vote in the 
average district and 61% of the legislative seats – about what could be expected in a redistricting plan 
that discriminated against neither political party. Small Democratic and Republican majorities in the 
average districts in Washington and New Jersey, respectively, were similarly magnified into slightly 
larger legislative majorities. Arizona on the other hand, awarded a legislative majority to the 
Republican even though Democrats received more votes in the average district, while Iowa did the 
reverse – a result that is unfair to the voters of the party that won more votes but fewer legislative 
seats. 
                                                 
9 The National Association of Latino Elected Officials and the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies in 
Washington, DC contributed the data on elected officials in these states.  
10 The percentage of votes received in the average legislative district is used, instead of a statewide percentage, 
because even neutrally-drawn districts will tend to reflect the fact that each vote cast in districts with low voter 
turnout has increased weight. Averaging unweighted district percentages takes this effect into account and provides 
for a more valid comparison. 
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Chart 4: Partisan Fairness Before Redistricting
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Chart 5 shows that, after redistricting, the states with Independent Redistricting Commissions made 
significant progress toward obtaining partisan fairness in the districts. In every state except 
Washington (where it still remained small), the “unfairness gap” – the gap between each party’s 
percent of votes in the average district and its percentage of legislative seats won – shrunk.  
Chart 5: Partisan Fairness After Redistricting
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Independent Redistricting Commissions in the sample states achieved consistent success at creating 
districts that were relatively fair to both major political parties. However, because California’s recent 
redistricting already made its small “unfairness gap” smaller, there appears to be little room for 
California to do more than hold the status quo. 
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Section 3: Recommended Commission Features 
 
The following recommendations are based on discussions with a number of California public interest 
organizations and seek to avoid the flaws in other Independent Redistricting Commission plans.  The 
Center for Governmental Studies plans to release a more detailed analysis of the pros and cons of 
Independent Redistricting Commission plans and possibly a model redistricting law later in the year. 
 
A. Recommended Commission Composition: 
 
1. The membership of the Commission should include retired judges and other citizens. Retired 
judges have valuable legal expertise and experience in making nonpartisan decisions. Citizens 
represent the public more directly, may provide the Commission with broader public 
credibility and can be selected for specific redistricting expertise.11  
 
2. The membership of the Commission should be large enough12 to reflect the gender and racial 
diversity of California’s residents. Specific requirements that the Commissioners reflect the 
gender and racial diversity of California’s residents should be included. 
 
3. The following previous experiences, which might create the appearance or instance of 
partisan motivations or other conflicts, should automatically disqualify candidates from 
serving on the Commission: Within the previous ten years, serving 1) in a partisan office, 2) 
as a paid lobbyist registered with the state or 3) as an officer of a political party or a partisan 
candidate’s campaign committee. 
 
4. Commissioners should be ineligible to run for Congressional, State Assembly, State Senate or 
Board of Equalization (BOE) office or work for any holder of such office for ten years after 
serving on the Commission, so that they do not benefit from the districts they help create. 
Commissioners should also be barred from serving as paid lobbyists registered with the state 
for five years after the conclusion of their Commission service. Ineligibility is preferred over a 
signed pledge, thus further ensuring that Commissioners do not reap political benefit from 
their redistricting decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 New Zealand’s “Representation Commission,” for example, is made up of two political appointees. Four non-
political appointees are the surveyor-general, government statistician, chief electoral officer and chairperson of the 
local government commission. Legislators in Massachusetts are currently proposing a “mixed” nine-member 
Commission using the following process: The Lawyers Committee on Civil Rights and the League of Women 
Voters would appoint one member each, the State Secretary would appoint either a former chief of the Secretary of 
State elections division, a former chief legal counsel to the division, or a member of a non-profit organization that 
advocates for voting rights; the Governor would appoint a dean or tenured professor of law, political science, or 
government in a private institution of higher learning; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court would appoint 
a retired justice. The four legislative leaders would then nominate five citizens each, from which the five directly 
nominated commissioners would choose four (one from each leader’s pool) by majority vote.  
12 Five Commissioners are more likely to be representative than three. We recommend at least nine in order to 
reflect racial, ethnic, and geographically defined populations that comprise less than 20% of the California 
electorate.  
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5. The Commission should give equal representation to California’s two largest parties in order 
to promote fairness and discourage partisan gerrymandering. There should also be a 
mechanism for representation of persons who are not affiliated with either of the major 
parties. 
 
B. Recommended Appointment Process 
 
1. An original pool of candidates of qualified retired judges and another pool of citizens should 
be selected by the Judicial Council. The pool of 36 candidates must reflect the racial diversity 
of California, have equal numbers of men and women, include six retired judge candidates 
registered with each major party, six citizens registered with each major party as well as six 
retired judges and six citizens registered with neither major party. 
 
2. Legislators should have limited influence over the final composition of the panel. The Speaker 
of the Assembly, the Minority Leader of the Assembly, the President pro Tempore and the 
Minority Leader of the Senate should each have the ability to preemptively challenge two 
candidates (one retired judge and one citizen) in the pool who they feel will be overly 
partisan, but they should not have the ability to nominate Commissioners directly. 
 
3. Once the pool has been established, a random process should be used to determine 
appointments in a manner that ensures fulfillment of requirements for racial diversity and 
selects three Commissioners from each major party and three Commissioners from neither.    
 
C. Recommended Commission Redistricting Criteria: 
 
The objectives the Commission must pursue should be explicitly prioritized in the measure to aid 
Commissioners in balancing competing objectives and limit their ability to use objectives as pretexts 
for altering districts in order to aid incumbents or one political party. 
 
1. All districts created by the Commission must be: 
• Equal in population according to federal standards 
• Contiguous 
• Nested so that Board of Equalization districts are comprised of ten adjacent State 
Senate districts, each of which is comprised of two adjacent assembly districts 
• Compliant with the Voting Rights Act and other federal laws 
• Neutral with respect to political parties, incumbents, and other candidates  
 
2. The Commission’s additional objectives, in priority order, should be: 
a. Full representation of racial and ethnic minorities 
b. More competitive districts 
c. Respecting identifiable communities of interest13 
d. Conforming to geographic and political lines to the extent practicable, except when 
crossing such boundaries will help achieve any of the higher-priority objectives 
e. Creating compact districts, except when less compact districts will help achieve any of 
the higher-priority objectives 
 
                                                 
13 Communities of interest should not be defined in reference to incumbents, other candidates, or previous districts. 
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3. Voter histories and partisan voter registration data necessary for creating competitive districts 
must be available to the Commission or its designated experts so that they can effectively 
pursue this objective. The Commission or state should appoint such an expert to evaluate the 
competitiveness of competing plans or advise how a specific plan could be made more 
competitive. 
 
4. The Commission should be given a clear definition of compactness (or instructed to adopt one 
before beginning to draft maps) based on a mathematical formula involving the cumulative 
length of district boundaries or other objective factors.  
 
5. Communities of interest should be defined by similarities in social, cultural, ethnic and 
economic interest, prevalent occupations and lifestyles, school districts, and other formal 
relationships between municipalities. The definition should not include any relationship 
between a community and a political party, incumbent or candidate. 
 
D. Recommended Requirements for Transparency and Public Accountability: 
 
Inviting public participation and ensuring the accessibility of information to the public before, during, 
and after the map-drafting process will ensure the level of transparency necessary for the public to 
have confidence in the fairness of the redistricting process. During each specified stage of the 
redistricting process, the Commission should adhere to the following guidelines. 
 
Initial Stage 
 
1. Appointments should be made before the census data are available and as early as 
possible to allow the Commission more time for preliminary work. 
2. Redistricting information, expertise and tools should be provided on-site14 for use by 
individuals and organizations as soon as relevant census information is available.  
3. The Commission should accept complete or partial redistricting proposals (maps) before 
the first scheduled hearings, catalog them, and make them publicly available via a website 
and other means.  Maps may be submitted by partisan interests, elected officials, minority 
voting rights organizations or other interested parties. 
4. The Commission should schedule its first set of public hearings around the state, with 
particular attention to geographic representation.  The Commission must provide adequate 
notice and schedule these hearings to occur over several months.  The initial stage of 
public hearings should occur before the Commission begins drawing maps.   
 
Commission Draft Map Stage 
 
1. After the initial stage, the Commission should make public its proposed redistricting 
proposal or proposals.  Independent experts should evaluate how well the Commission-
created maps comply with all of the listed criteria.  
2. Following the publication of the first Commission draft map(s), the Commission should 
hold a second round of hearings around the state for at least two weeks.  
 
                                                 
14 For example, academic centers like the Rose Institute and the Institute of Governmental Studies could be used for 
this purpose. 
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Final Plan Stage  
 
1. Based on public comment on the Commission Draft Map(s), the Commission may make 
changes.  Additional public hearings shall be held after any significant revisions are made 
to draft maps. 
2. The Commission should receive public comment for at least 14 days on any proposed 
Final Plan (although the Commission would be under no obligation to make changes). 
3. The Commission must explain how it met the criteria, especially compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act, in a report due when the Final Plan is proposed.  
 
Throughout the redistricting process, the Commission should: 
 
• Allow a minimum of six months for the redistricting process, including at least five months 
after the census data are available.   
• Open all meetings to the public with adequate prior notification. 
• Make all maps and agenda items to be discussed at a given meeting or hearing available to 
the public and post them to a website at least one week before the meeting or hearing (and 
with more notice when possible) to allow individuals and organizations the opportunity to 
analyze options and prepare statements before meetings or hearings.  
• Post all hearing transcripts, meeting minutes, maps, narrative descriptions of proposed 
districts, and other data to a public website in a timely manner. 
• Comply with the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act. 
• Bar ex parte communications regarding redistricting except those that are exclusively between 
Commissioners and staff. 
• Make available to the public all personal ex parte communication (such as email, memos, and 
phone calls) between Commissioners and staff once the Final Plan has been proposed.  
• Bar legislators from invoking legislative privilege in regard to their communications with the 
Commission, including the submission of testimony or proposals. 
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E. Recommended Procedures for Implementation and Review: 
 
1. The redistricting process should respect the “once a decade” precedent in order to avoid more 
frequent partisan efforts to alter redistricting outcomes. 
 
2. The plan should require super-majority approval (six of the nine of the Commissioners, 
including at least one Commissioner affiliated with neither major party) in order to balance 
the risk of allowing a partisan plan (which can occur when a bare majority of Commissioners 
can enact a plan) and the risk of producing an incumbent-protection plan (which often occurs 
when Commissioners must come to a consensus). 
 
3. New district plans should be implemented, subject to California Supreme Court review, 
without requiring a separate legislative vote or public referendum after each new round of 
redistricting. A legislative review would necessarily politicize the process, creating 
opportunities for partisan and incumbent-protection gerrymandering. A referendum on the 
final redistricting plan would be difficult to conduct in a manner that allowed the average 
voter to be fully informed of the complexities of various district maps. 
 
4. The Commission should have dedicated funding for Commissioners, staff and consultants and 
the authority to determine if such funding is adequate to free the Commission from political 
control (e.g., a specified sum indexed to the California Consumer Price Index should be 
established as a minimum to which the legislature could add, but not subtract).  
 
5. The Commission should have standing in legal actions regarding a redistricting plan and sole 
authority to determine whether the California Attorney General or other counsel hired and 
selected by the Independent Redistricting Commission will represent the people of California 
in the legal defense of a redistricting plan. 
 
6. The Supreme Court should have original and exclusive jurisdiction in all proceedings where a 
plan adopted by the Commission is challenged.  The Commission appointment process should 
be open for judicial review before the Commission is officially sworn in.  
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Section 4: Overall Evaluation of Commission Proposals  
 
Goal Costa McCarthy Lowenthal 
Minority Representation Very Poor Poor Fair 
Competitiveness Very Poor Poor Fair 
Avoidance of Partisan 
Gerrymandering 
Fair Fair Fair 
Avoidance of  
Bipartisan Deal-Making 
Fair Fair Fair 
Transparency/Public 
Participation  
Fair Poor Fair 
Costa  
 
Competitive districts:  
Competitiveness, Costa’s stated chief objective in advocating on behalf of his initiative, is not 
mentioned in the criteria for drawing district lines. To the extent that Costa’s plan decreases 
incumbent-protection and prioritizes compactness, there may be increased competitiveness. 
Unfortunately, Costa’s ban on the use of information about voter history or party registration 
information leaves competitiveness up to chance. 
 
Minority Representation:  
Three retired judges are unlikely to be able to reflect California’s diversity. Although compliance with 
the Voting Rights Act is mentioned as a criterion, communities of interest are not. Moreover, creating 
such communities becomes difficult when geographic and political boundaries, compactness and 
equal population are given priority.  
 
Partisan Fairness:  
Costa’s process may decrease the likelihood of a partisan gerrymander in several ways: barring the 
legislature from determining the candidate pool; allowing legislative leaders only to choose members 
of the opposite party; allowing legislative leaders to peremptorily strike one nominee; mandating a 
unanimous vote; using traditional redistricting criteria; maintaining a high level of transparency; and, 
eliminating information about voters from the map-making process.  
 
Traditional Redistricting Criteria:  
Costa uses very strict traditional redistricting criteria, including requirements that: legislative district 
population deviation not exceed 1% (when up to 10% can be used currently); geographic and 
political boundaries be respected; the splitting up of counties and cities into multiple districts be 
minimized; districts be as contiguous and compact as possible.  
 
Inspiring Public Confidence:  
Costa’s proposal includes strong requirements for transparency. In addition to public hearings, all 
meetings, records and data are open to the public, no ex parte communication is allowed and the 
Commission must be in compliance with the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act.  
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Interestingly, Costa requires a citizen vote to enact a completed redistricting plan. While this may 
convey a feeling of power to voters, it is unlikely that the average voter will feel up to the task when 
confronted with as arcane and complex a subject as redistricting.  
McCarthy 
 
Competitive districts:   
McCarthy defines competitiveness as a 7% spread between the two major parties, but then prohibits 
the use of voter history and party registration information necessary to distribute voters into 
competitive districts.15 Additionally, the use of the single variable of party registration is unlikely to be 
as useful in predicting which districts will be competitive as a formula that takes into account multiple 
variables. In addition, the lack of public scrutiny and the requirement for a unanimous vote may 
increase the likelihood for a behind-closed-doors incumbent-protection deal.  
 
Minority Representation:  
McCarthy does not provide for minority diversity on the Commission, but does provide for 
communities of interest in its criteria, even asking the Commission to respect such communities “to 
the greatest extent possible.” That extent, however, may be very limited once traditional redistricting 
criteria like geographic and political boundaries, compactness and strict equal population are first 
taken into account.  
 
Partisan Fairness:  
McCarthy’s process may decrease the likelihood of an unfair partisan gerrymander in three ways: 
barring the legislature from determining the candidate pool; requiring the plan to fulfill traditional 
redistricting criteria; and, eliminating information about voters from the redistricting process.  
 
Traditional Redistricting Criteria:  
McCarthy uses very strict traditional redistricting criteria, including requirements that legislative 
district population deviation not exceed 1% (when up to 10% can be used currently); districts be as 
contiguous and compact as possible; common county boundaries not be crossed more than once; and 
creating districts with the most whole counties and the fewest county fragments possible. 
 
Inspiring Public Confidence:   
McCarthy requires the highest number of public hearings (one before and one after a draft map is 
created in each of at least six different regions of the state) and allows individuals to submit plans and 
testify before and after a draft map is created. While this will certainly inspire some public 
confidence, McCarthy fails to open all meetings to the public or require that data and other 
documents be shared with the public.  
Lowenthal 
 
Competitive districts:  
Lowenthal includes competitiveness among the criteria, but designates it as the sixth and last 
criterion, which may lead the Commission to ignore it, as Arizona’s Commission did. Lowenthal, 
however, provides the tools – voter histories and party registration information – needed to distribute 
                                                 
15 See Michael McDonald, “Public Interest Guidelines for Redistricting.” United States Elections Project, George 
Mason University. 
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voters into competitive districts. Additionally, Lowenthal’s use of a majority vote and the designation 
of a voting Commission Chair who belongs to neither major party may decrease the likelihood of a 
bipartisan deal and thus increase the likelihood of competitive districts.16  
 
Minority Representation:  
Lowenthal fails to require diversity on the Commission. Lowenthal’s proposed Commission size is 
larger than 3, allowing for a greater possibility of diversity.  Additionally, Lowenthal does not limit 
the pool of nominees to retired judges, making more diversity of representation possible, though not 
assured.  Lowenthal requires adherence to the Voting Rights Act as its first priority and prioritizes 
communities of interest higher than adherence to geographic and political boundaries in the criteria. 
This provides an important structure and mechanism for protecting minority interests.  
 
Partisan Fairness:  
Lowenthal uses a balanced partisan commission, which may check some partisan tendencies.17 
Allowing legislative leaders to choose members, however, increases the likelihood that members will 
act in a partisan or incumbent-friendly manner. Lowenthal allows for the use of voter history and 
party registration information (once an initial map using more traditional redistricting criteria is 
complete) to assist in the creation of competitive districts. While voter history or party registration 
information is necessary for this reason, it can also be used for partisan gerrymandering. Public 
meetings and hearings are useful mechanisms for ensuring partisan fairness, but allowing only 
independent “competitiveness experts” to view party registration and voter history data and a 
requirement for a written report laying out the justifications for departures from traditional 
redistricting criteria would also be useful.  
 
Traditional Redistricting Criteria:  
Lowenthal includes all traditional redistricting criteria (equal population, compactness, contiguity, 
communities of interest, visible geographic features, and municipal and county lines), but does not 
provide assistance with defining them.  
 
Inspiring Public Confidence:  
Lowenthal should inspire a high degree of public confidence. In addition to public hearings, all 
meetings, records and data are required to be made public, except for preliminary drafts, notes, and 
communications between Commissioners.  
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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Other Redistricting Proposals 
 
There are some additional proposals that merit mentioning. Since most vary only slightly from the 
measures discussed in this report, we have chosen not to provide in-depth analysis.  
 
Two initiatives submitted by David A. Gilliard 
Gilliard’s first initiative is nearly identical to Costa’s, while his second effort is almost 
indistinguishable from McCarthy’s. The one exception to both initiatives is a call for mid-decade 
redistricting for state offices, while congressional districts would remain untouched until 2011. 
 
ACA 8, Maze (R-Visalia)  
Maze appears to have been the model for the McCarthy’s bill. Maze, however, differs in a few key 
respects: The measure includes five retired judges as Commissioners, specifically requires that at least 
one special master be female and at least one be a minority, and has slightly stricter qualifications on 
which retired judges would be allowed to serve.  
 
ACAX1 5, Canciamilla (D-Pittsburg) and Richman (R-Chatsworth) 
This initiative is identical to Lowenthal’s, except that it does not require the nesting of Assembly 
districts within Senate districts, has less rigorous requirements for public disclosure, and omits 
language guaranteeing the California Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over 
challenges to redistricting plans. 
 
Initiative submitted by Allan Zaremberg, California Chamber of Commerce President 
This initiative is identical to Costa’s, except that it eschews mid-decade redistricting for all offices and 
goes into effect only after the 2010 census.  
 
Four initiatives submitted by Robert H. Harris, of Jim Gonzales & Associates 
These four different initiatives duplicate Costa’s efforts, but additionally focus on equal representation 
for minorities. Gonzalez includes a section on the Voting Rights Act, notes that the dilution of 
minority voting strength is divergent from public policy and suggests that the representative system of 
government should be a reflection of California’s diverse demographics. In terms of criteria, the equal 
population, compactness and geographic boundary requirements are softened slightly, communities of 
interest are defined and voting history is made permissible for map drawing.  
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Appendix: Detailed Comparison of Commission Proposals  
 
Interest in redistricting reform has been on the rise since 2001, when the California legislature passed 
a map likely to ensure the reelection of incumbents. The 2004 elections proved just how successful 
they were in this endeavor when no incumbents lost reelection campaigns and all legislative seats 
remained in the hands of the same party. In response to this development, several legislative and 
ballot initiatives have been proposed to transfer control of the redistricting process away from the 
legislature and into the hands of an Independent Redistricting Commission. In this appendix, the three 
most significant proposals – Kevin McCarthy’s ACAX1 3 (R-Bakersfield), whose endorsers include 
several Republicans and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Alan Lowenthal’s (D-Long Beach) SCA 3, 
and a ballot initiative introduced by Ted Costa – are compared in reference to the recommendations 
outlined in this report.  
 
A. Commission Membership 
 
Composition of Commission: 
 
o Commissioners in the Costa and McCarthy proposals are retired judges nominated by 
the Judicial Council, while Lowenthal has a group of citizens nominated by a panel of 
10 retired judges of the Courts of Appeal (who themselves are selected by the 
Commission on Judicial Appointments) and selected by legislative leaders.  
 
o Costa and McCarthy require only three Commissioners, while Lowenthal requires five, 
allowing a greater opportunity for diversity.  
 
o Costa and McCarthy require that at least one of the special masters be a member of 
each of the two major parties, but do allow for the possibility of partisan imbalance. 
Lowenthal requires an equal number of members of each major party. 
 
Qualifications and Limitations on Future Political Work: 
 
o All three proposals bar commission members who have held partisan office or have 
recently changed party registration.  
 
o Lowenthal additionally takes the positive step of prohibiting commission members 
who have registered as paid lobbyists or served as officers of political parties or 
candidates’ campaign committees. 
 
o Costa and McCarthy require that Special Masters pledge not to run for partisan office 
or accept political appointments for several years after their service as Special Masters. 
Since such a pledge could be broken, Lowenthal makes members of the Commission 
ineligible for such offices (and also for registration as paid lobbyists). 
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Reference Chart: Commission Membership 
 
 Costa McCarthy  Lowenthal  Ideal Plan  
Type of members Retired judges Retired judges  Citizens  Retired judges and 
other citizens 
# of members  3 3 5 9 
Member diversity 
required  
No  No No Yes  
Voting Requirement Unanimous  Not mentioned  3 of 5  Super-majority of 6 
Disqualifying past 
experience18 
Having held partisan 
political office ever; 
changed party 
affiliation since 
appointment/election 
to judicial office; 
received income 
within previous 12 
months from state or 
federal legislatures, 
parties or campaign 
committees 
Having held partisan 
political office ever or 
changed party 
affiliation in the 
previous 5 years 
Having registered as a 
lobbyist, held partisan 
office or office for a 
political party, or 
performed paid work 
for a party or 
candidate’s campaign 
in the previous 3 years  
In the past 10 years, 
having held partisan 
office or office for a 
political party; 
performed paid work 
for a party or 
candidate’s campaign; 
or changed partisan 
affiliation. In the past 
5 years having 
registered as a 
lobbyist   
Limitations on future 
public office/public 
employment other 
than academic or 
judicial posts 
Must pledge not to 
accept for 5 years 
Must pledge not to 
accept for 5 years 
Ineligible for 3 years Ineligible for 10  years 
to run in districts 
created by the 
Commission or to 
work for those 
holding such offices 
Limitations on 
lobbying  
No No Yes, for 3 years after 
serving   
Yes, for 5 years after 
serving  
Requires equal 
commission 
representation of two 
largest political parties 
For candidate pool, 
but not for 
Commission 
No Yes Yes 
 
B. Appointment Process 
 
Selection of Special Masters/Commissioners: 
 
o Costa instructs the Judicial Council to select twenty-four qualified retired judges, an equal number 
of whom must be registered with each major political party. The majority and minority leaders of 
both legislative houses each then nominate three judges from that pool who are not registered 
with that legislative leader’s political party. Each legislative leader may peremptorily strike one 
nominee from the list. Three judges are then chosen at random to serve on the Commission, with 
the provision that at least one must be affiliated with each major political party, but allowing the 
possibility that two members of the same party may be chosen.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The Ideal and Lowenthal plan partisan/public office restrictions exclude school board members or other officers of 
a school district or county office of education.  
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o McCarthy instructs the Judicial Council to identify qualified retired judges willing to serve as 
Special Masters and then select three (and three alternates) at random to serve on the commission 
– subject to the restriction that at least one Special Master be a member of each of the two largest 
political parties, but allowing the possibility that two members of the same party may be chosen.  
 
o Lowenthal instructs the Commission on Judicial Appointments (comprised of the Chief Justice, 
the Attorney General, and the senior presiding justice of the Courts of Appeal) to select a panel of 
ten retired judges of the Courts of Appeal, who must in turn nominate a pool of twenty-five 
qualified citizens (including ten registered with each of the two largest political parties and five 
who are registered with neither of those two parties). The majority and minority leaders of both 
legislative houses each select one of those citizens to serve on the Commission. Those four 
appointees then choose a fifth member to chair the Commission from among the five nominees 
who are registered with neither major party. 
 
Reference Chart: Appointment Process 
 
 Costa McCarthy  Lowenthal  Ideal Plan  
Candidate pool 
selected by 
Judicial Council 
selects 24 retired 
judges 
Judicial Council 
identifies qualified 
judges willing to 
serve 
10 retired judges on the 
Courts of Appeals (chosen 
by Commission on Judicial 
Appointments) establish a 
pool of 25 citizens 
Judicial Council selects one 
pool of qualified retired 
judges and another equally-
sized candidate pool of 
qualified other citizens 
Candidate pool 
composition 
Equal representation 
of parties, no more 
than 12 from any 
single party 
All qualified 
retired state and 
federal judges 
willing to serve 
10 Democrats, 10 
Republicans, and 5 other 
citizens who are not 
registered with either of 
those parties.   
Each pool must: 
reflect California’s racial 
diversity; include equal 
numbers of men and 
women; (for retired judges 
and citizens each) include 6 
candidates registered with 
each major party and 6 
registered with neither 
major party 
Legislative leaders’ 
procedure for 
nomination or 
peremptory challenge  
of nominees 
4 legislative leaders 
nominate 3 
candidates who are 
not of the leader’s 
party, then may 
preemptively 
challenge 1 
candidate each 
None 4 legislative leaders each 
choose a member; those 4 
members selects a chair 
from among the 5 other 
citizens 
Each of the 4 legislative 
leaders may preemptively 
challenge 1 retired judge 
and 1 citizen and eliminate 
them from the pool 
Final selection 3 special masters 
and 3 alternates are 
chosen at random 
from remaining 
nominees; 1 or more 
special master must 
be from each of the 
two major parties 
3 special masters 
and 3 alternates 
are chosen at 
random from pool 
4 legislative leaders each 
select one citizen. The 4 
vote in a 5th member as 
chair who is not registered 
with either of the political 
parties already represented 
3 Commissioners affiliated 
with each major party and 3 
Commissioners affiliated 
with neither are randomly 
selected from the remaining 
candidate pool in a manner 
designed to ensure racial 
diversity 
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C. Redistricting Criteria  
 
Prioritization of Competitiveness and Minority Representation: 
 
o Lowenthal explicitly prioritizes the objectives the Commission must pursue, while Costa and 
McCarthy do not. 
 
o Lowenthal ranks compliance with the Voting Rights Act as its first objective, Costa includes it as 
an objective, and McCarthy does not explicitly refer to the Voting Rights Act at all. 
 
o Lowenthal includes competitiveness as a criterion, but ranks it as the least important of six 
criteria. McCarthy includes competitiveness, but prohibits any consideration of partisan data 
necessary to determine the competitiveness of districts. Costa does not list competitiveness as an 
objective. 
 
Defining terms and avoiding bias: 
 
o None of the proposals adequately define, or require the Commission to define, “compact” or 
“communities of interest.” Unlike the other two proposals, McCarthy defines “competitiveness,” 
but uses an imperfect measure of party registration data that may tend to create Republican-
leaning districts and does not even allow the Commission to access necessary data. 
 
o All of the proposals prohibit aid to incumbents or parties, but only Lowenthal allows the 
Commission access to partisan registration data for the purpose of determining competitiveness. 
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Reference Chart: Redistricting Criteria 
 
 Costa McCarthy  Lowenthal  Ideal Plan  
Explicitly prioritizes 
criteria  
No No  Yes Yes  
Explicitly defines 
criterion terms  
No No No Yes 
VRA compliance 
explicitly mentioned 
Yes No Yes Yes  
Population equality  Yes – defined as 1% 
deviation 
Yes – defined as 1% 
deviation 
Yes, within federal 
guidelines 
Yes, within federal 
guidelines  
Contiguousness 
required 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Compactness 
Required 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Requires conforming 
to geographic and 
political lines 
Yes, and no census 
block shall be 
fragmented unless 
required by U.S. 
Constitution 
Yes, as well as visible 
geographic features  
Yes, as well as visible 
geographic features 
and undivided census 
tracts 
Where reasonable, but 
as a lower priority 
than other objectives 
 
Communities of 
Interest  
No mention Yes, to greatest extent 
possible 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Competition  No mention Listed after several 
other criteria, but not 
explicitly ranked. 
Defined as a district 
with a difference of 
no more than 7% 
between the numbers 
of voters who are 
registered with the 
two major political 
parties 
Ranked as the least 
important criteria, to 
be favored where 
doing so would 
“create no significant 
detriment” to the 
other listed goals 
 
Creation of as many 
competitive districts as 
reasonably possible 
should be a high 
priority and aided by 
independent experts 
who predict the 
number of competitive 
districts in various 
maps 
Availability of partisan 
registration or voting 
history data 
Commission cannot 
use information 
related to political 
party affiliation or the 
voting history of the 
electors 
Consideration should 
not be given to the 
potential effect on 
political parties. Data 
regarding party 
affiliation or voting 
history may not be 
used in plan 
preparation 
Party registration and 
voting history data 
must be excluded 
from first phase of 
mapping process, but 
can be used to test 
maps for compliance 
with the stated criteria  
 
Consideration should 
not be given to the 
potential effect on 
political parties. Voter 
information can be 
used to ensure 
compliance to criteria 
only  
Incumbents Commission cannot 
use incumbent’s 
residence information 
when drawing maps  
 
Consideration should 
not be given to the 
potential effect on 
incumbents  
 
Commission cannot 
use information 
related to the 
incumbent’s residence 
or design districts to 
benefit incumbents  
 
Consideration should 
not be given to the 
potential effect on 
incumbents  
or other potential 
candidates  
Nesting  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes   
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D. Transparency and Public Accountability 
 
Public Hearings, Open Meetings, and Transparent Decision-Making: 
 
o McCarthy requires a public schedule and the opportunity for electors to submit plans, as well as 
public hearings in at least six different regions of the state – both before an initial set of maps is 
developed and after any substantial revisions are made. Costa only requires a minimum of three 
total public hearings. Lowenthal requires public comment “in a manner designed to achieve the 
widest public dissemination reasonably possible” for 30 days.  
 
o Lowenthal and Costa both require that all meetings be open to the public and that public notice 
be given. Lowenthal specifies at least 48 hours notice before each meeting. In addition, 
Lowenthal requires that all records and data (except preliminary drafts, notes, and 
communications between members) be made public. Costa also requires compliance with the 
Bagley Keene Open Meeting Act and makes ex parte communication impermissible.  
 
Reference Chart: Transparency and Public Accountability 
 
 Costa McCarthy  Lowenthal  Ideal Plan  
Will Commission be 
governed by Bagley 
Keene Open 
Meeting Act? 
Yes  No  No, but meetings are 
required to be open to 
the public 
Yes 
Are ex parte 
communications 
prohibited? 
Yes No No Yes, except between 
Commissioners and staff 
Are transcripts, data 
and documents 
required to be 
publicly available? 
Yes Not mentioned Yes, except preliminary 
drafts, notes and 
member 
communications  
Yes; ex parte 
communications will be 
made public after Final Plan 
is proposed  
Public hearings 
requirements 
At least three 
public 
hearings 
throughout 
the state 
 
Public hearings must 
take place before and 
after a draft map is 
prepared, in a minimum 
of six different 
geographic areas around 
the state 
The Commission will 
display a draft map to 
the public for 
comment, in a manner 
designed to achieve the 
widest public 
dissemination 
reasonably possible  
Public hearings must take 
place in several different 
geographic areas of the 
state both as part of the 
process of creating a draft 
map and in order to present 
and discuss draft maps 
Period to receive 
public comment 
Scheduled by 
Commission; 
no public 
comment 
planned after 
the Final Plan 
is adopted 
Scheduled by 
Commission; no public 
comment planned after 
the Final Plan is adopted 
At least 30 days on any 
proposed plan 
Before initial plan is 
drafted, including 
submission of partial or full 
map proposals; at least 2 
weeks after the initial plan; 
after significant changes; 
for 14 days on any Final 
Plan 
Involvement of 
interest groups  
No mention Can propose plans to the 
Commission for 
consideration 
No mention To aid in determining 
communities of interest and 
maximize fair representation 
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E. Procedures for Implementation and Review 
 
Enactment, Court Review, and Litigation Funding:  
 
o McCarthy and Lowenthal make new districts effective as soon as the Commission certifies a final 
plan to the Secretary of State.  
   
o Costa requires that the “final redistricting plan be approved by a single resolution adopted 
unanimously by the Special Masters” and only be used in the next statewide primary and general 
election unless it is “adopted by initiative…for succeeding elections.” 
 
o Costa and McCarthy require a mid-decade round of redistricting immediately after adoption, 
while Lowenthal would wait to draw new lines until after the next decennial census. 
 
Reference Chart: Procedures for Implementation and Review 
 
 Costa McCarthy  Lowenthal  Ideal Plan  
Gubernatorial veto  No No No No  
Legislature votes No No No No 
Citizens vote on each 
map of districts 
Yes No No No 
Enactment  
time-table 
Immediately (mid-
term 2006)  
Immediately (mid-
term 2006) 
After decennial census After decennial census 
Appeal directly to the 
Supreme Court  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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A Public Interest Guide to Real Redistricting Reform 
 
 
Drawing Lines calls for an Independent Redistricting Commission to shape California’s future electoral 
districts.  By transferring power from the state legislature to an Independent Redistricting 
Commission, competition and fairness will be strengthened.  
 
Drawing Lines proposes the following “public interest” criteria for California redistricting: 
 
• Independence:  Redistricting should be performed by an Independent Commission of citizens, 
not legislators, and it should operate free of legislative or partisan influence.  
 
• Minority Representation: The Commission should represent California’s full range of ethnic 
diversity in both its membership and standards for drawing districts.  
 
• Competition:  Electoral districts should be drawn to maximize competition whenever possible, 
consistent with other important goals.  
 
• Transparency and Public Accountability: The Commission must maintain public confidence 
through public hearings, open meetings, accessible data, and transparent decision-making.  
 
• Implementation and Review:  The Commission should receive sufficient resources to obtain 
expert consultants, conduct public hearings and defend against legal challenges. 
 
• Decennial Redistricting: Redistricting should be undertaken only once every ten years.  
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 Analysis of Revised McCarthy Legislation (ACAX1 3) 
 
 
Section 1: Introduction  
 
In February 2005, the Center for Governmental Studies (CGS) and Dēmos published Drawing Lines: 
A Public Interest Guide to Real Redistricting Reform.  Based on in-depth research of current 
redistricting approaches and extensive discussions with public interest organizations from across 
California, Drawing Lines proposes that California take redistricting out of the hands of the 
legislature and empower an Independent Redistricting Commission to complete the decennial 
redistricting process. 
 
Drawing Lines establishes overarching goals for redistricting; recommends specific Commission 
characteristics; compares and analyzes several current measures proposed in California; evaluates 
current measures against our recommendations; and assesses the ability of these measures to fulfill 
public interest redistricting goals.  
 
Since the report’s publication, ACAX1 3, authored by Assemblyman Kevin McCarthy (R - 
Bakersfield), has been amended.  The following analysis compares the amended bill (“McCarthy II”) 
to the proposed guidelines in Drawing Lines.  This report has been made possible through generous 
funding from The James Irvine Foundation.  The Irvine Foundation is not responsible, however, for 
the findings and recommendations in this study. 
 
Our findings suggest that McCarthy II is a significant improvement in several key areas of concern 
including balanced partisan representation, transparency, public participation, panel size and 
candidate pool diversity.  It does, however, still contain some aspects which warrant improvement. 
 
 
Section 2: Potential Improvements to McCarthy II  
 
McCarthy II requires improvement in a number of respects, listed in order of their importance:   
 
1) McCarthy II allows mid-decade redistricting. We believe the state should be redistricted only 
once every ten years, respecting traditional decennial redistricting principles and allowing for 
use of current and accurate census information.  
 
2) The Commission has only five retired judges as members. In order to reflect the full ethnic 
diversity of California, the membership should be larger and include citizens who are not 
judges. We suggest nine members made up of four retired judges and five other citizens.  
 
3) Although competitive districts are mentioned as criteria, competitiveness is prioritized last. 
Furthermore, the language, “where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other 
goals of this section,” weakens it greatly. We believe it should be higher in priority, below 
communities of interest, and listed without the caveat.  
 
4) Geographic boundaries are given higher priority than communities of interest and 
competition. We believe geographic boundaries should be given comparatively lower priority. 
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5) Compactness is given priority over competitiveness. We believe compactness should be 
prioritized last. Although compactness is important, it is less so than other criteria.  
 
6) There are no hearings scheduled after a Final Map has been issued by the Commission, nor is 
there a report required explaining how the Commission met the criteria. We believe hearings 
should continue for two weeks after the Commission releases the Final Map and makes 
the criteria compliance report public. 
  
7) The panel does not explicitly give standing to the Commission in legal actions regarding a 
redistricting plan. We believe the Commission should have standing and sole authority to 
determine whether the California Attorney General or other counsel hired and selected by the 
Commission will represent the people of California in the legal defense of a redistricting plan.  
 
8) The legislature has the authority to raise or lower the Commission’s funding. We suggest a 
minimum be allocated and the legislature be given authority to appropriate more funding, but 
not to decrease it. 
 
9) Equal population is defined as 1% for state districts. Use of this stringent definition may make 
it difficult to draw districts that fairly represent minorities, protect communities of interest and 
increase competition. We believe equal population criterion for state legislative districts 
should be defined as merely respecting federal constitutional standards as interpreted by the 
courts. 
 
10) The ban on future appointment to any elective government position or running for political 
office is five years. In order to ensure that no Commissioner benefits from his or her 
redistricting decisions, we believe the limit should be extended to ten years for running for 
Congress, State Assembly, State Senate or Board of Equalization or for working for any 
holder of such office. 
 
Section 3:  General Comments on McCarthy II  
 
Competitive districts:  
McCarthy II includes competitiveness as the last criterion and weakens it considerably by stating “the 
panel shall create competitive districts where to do so would create no significant detriment to the 
other goals of this section.” Arizona’s experience with its redistricting commission suggests that de-
prioritizing competitiveness may lead the Commission to ignore it. Should the Commission set out to 
draw competitive districts, it will have access to party registration and voter history data, which is the 
information necessary to distribute voters into competitive districts, an important amendment to the 
original McCarthy bill.  
 
Minority Representation:  
McCarthy II provides for diversity in the pool from which Commissions are chosen. This  increases 
the likelihood of minority and female Commissioners, but does not guarantee it. In the criteria, 
McCarthy II also explicitly provides for and defines communities of interest in its criteria, and says 
that the Commission should respect such communities “to the greatest extent possible.” That, 
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however, may be somewhat limited once traditional redistricting criteria like geographic and political 
boundaries and strict equal population are first taken into account.  
 
Partisan Fairness:  
McCarthy II seeks to create a balanced partisan commission, which may check some partisan 
tendencies.  The legislature has very limited influence on the membership process. The four legislative 
leaders are allowed one preemptory strike each on the pool. McCarthy II allows for the use of voter 
history and party registration information (once an initial map using more traditional redistricting 
criteria is complete) by independent experts to assist in the creation of competitive districts. Although 
voter history or party registration information is necessary for this reason, it can also be used for 
partisan gerrymandering. Public meetings and hearings are useful mechanisms for ensuring partisan 
fairness, as is allowing only independent “competitiveness experts” to view party registration and 
voter history data.  
 
Traditional Redistricting Criteria:  
McCarthy II uses strict traditional redistricting criteria, including requirements that legislative district 
population deviation not exceed a 1% difference in population between districts with the highest and 
lowest populations (when plus or minus 5% can be used currently); districts be as contiguous and 
compact as practicable; common county boundaries not be crossed more than once; and districts be 
created with the most whole counties and fewest county fragments possible. 
 
Inspiring Public Confidence:  
McCarthy II should inspire a very high degree of public confidence. Besides public hearings 
throughout the process (before the initial map is created, after an initial plan is selected by the 
Commission, and when significant revisions are made), independent experts will evaluate compliance 
with the criteria. In addition, all meeting minutes, hearing transcripts, maps, narrative descriptions of 
proposed districts and other data are required to be made public; no ex parte communication is 
allowed; and the Commission must be in compliance with the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act.   
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Section 4:  
 
Comparative Analysis: 
 McCarthy  McCarthy II  Ideal Plan  
1. Are major parties guaranteed equal representation on 
Commission? 
 
No Yes  Yes 
2. Is the Commission instructed to make districts more 
competitive? 
 
 Yes Yes Yes 
3. Is the Commission given the data and instructions necessary 
to make significantly more competitive districts likely? 
 
No No Yes 
4. Is Voting Rights Act compliance explicitly required and 
prioritized? 
 
No Yes Yes 
5. Is the Commission likely to reflect California’s diversity? 
 
No Somewhat Yes 
6. Is the Commission prohibited from using incumbent 
residence when drawing districts? 
 
No Yes Yes 
7. Are all Commission meetings required to be open to the 
public? 
 
No Yes Yes 
8. Must most of the Commission’s data and documents be 
made public? 
 
No Yes Yes 
9. Will the “once a decade” redistricting rule be maintained? 
 
No No Yes 
       10.   Will the Commission’s proposals be implemented without 
requiring an additional legislative or popular vote? 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix:   Detailed Comparison of Commission Proposals  
 
A. Commission Membership 
 
 McCarthy I  McCarthy II  Ideal Plan  
Type of members Retired judges  Retired judges Retired judges and other citizens 
# of members  3 5 9 
Member diversity 
required  
No Yes (in pool)  Yes (in pool and panel)  
Voting Requirement Majority  Super-majority of 4 Super-majority of 6 
Disqualifying past 
experience1 
Having held 
partisan political 
office ever or 
changed party 
affiliation in the 
previous 5 years 
Having held 
partisan public 
office, political 
party office, served 
as a registered 
lobbyist ever,  or 
changed party 
affiliation in the 
previous 5 years 
In the past 10 years, having held 
partisan office or office for a 
political party; performed paid 
work for a party or candidate’s 
campaign; or changed partisan 
affiliation. In the past 5 years 
having registered as a lobbyist   
Limitations on 
future public 
office/public 
employment other 
than academic or 
judicial posts 
Must pledge not to 
accept for 5 years 
Must pledge not to 
accept for 5 years 
Ineligible for 10  years to run in 
districts created by the Commission 
or to work for those holding such 
offices 
Limitations on 
future lobbying  
No No  Yes, for 5 years after serving  
Requires equal 
commission 
representation of 
two largest political 
parties 
No Yes Yes 
 
                                                 
1 Lowenthal plan excludes school board members or other officers of a school district or county office of 
education.  
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B. Appointment Process 
 
 McCarthy I  McCarthy II  Ideal Plan  
Candidate pool 
selected by 
Judicial Council 
identifies qualified 
judges willing to serve 
Judicial Council 
identifies 25 qualified 
judges willing to serve  
Judicial Council selects one 
pool of qualified retired 
judges and another equally-
sized candidate pool of 
qualified other citizens 
Candidate pool 
composition 
All qualified retired 
state and federal judges 
willing to serve 
To the extent possible, 
the list of qualified 
judges shall reflect the 
ethnic, racial, gender 
and geographical 
diversity of California 
Each pool must: 
reflect California’s racial 
diversity; include equal 
numbers of men and women; 
(for retired judges and citizens 
each) include 6 candidates 
registered with each major 
party and 6 registered with 
neither major party 
Legislative leaders’ 
procedure for 
nomination or 
peremptory 
challenge  of 
nominees 
None Each of the 4 legislative 
leaders may 
preemptively challenge 
1 retired judge and 
eliminate them from 
the pool 
Each of the 4 legislative 
leaders may preemptively 
challenge 1 retired judge and 
1 citizen and eliminate them 
from the pool 
Final selection 3 special masters and 3 
alternates are chosen at 
random from pool  
5 special masters and 5 
alternates are chosen at 
random from pool of 
remaining candidates  
3 Commissioners affiliated 
with each major party and 3 
Commissioners affiliated with 
neither are chosen at random 
from pool of remaining 
candidates in a manner 
designed to ensure racial 
diversity 
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C. Redistricting Criteria  
 
 McCarthy I  McCarthy II  Ideal Plan  
Explicitly prioritizes 
criteria  
No  Yes  Yes  
VRA compliance 
explicitly mentioned 
No Yes  Yes  
Population equality  Yes – defined as 1% 
deviation 
Yes – defined as 1% 
deviation 
Yes, within federal 
guidelines  
Contiguousness 
required 
Yes Yes Yes 
Compactness 
Required 
Yes Yes Yes 
Requires conforming 
to geographic and 
political lines 
Yes, as well as visible 
geographic features  
Yes  Where reasonable, but 
as a lower priority than 
most other objectives 
 
Communities of 
Interest  
Yes, to greatest extent 
possible 
 
Yes, to greatest extent 
possible  
Yes 
 
Competition  Listed after several other 
criteria, but not explicitly 
ranked. Defined as a 
district with a difference 
of no more than 7% 
between the numbers of 
voters who are registered 
with the two major 
political parties 
Ranked as the least 
important criteria, to be 
favored where doing so 
would “create no significant 
detriment” to the other 
listed goals 
 
Creation of as many 
competitive districts as 
reasonably possible 
should be a high priority 
and aided by 
independent experts 
who predict the number 
of competitive districts 
in various maps 
Availability of 
partisan registration 
or voting history data 
Consideration should not 
be given to the potential 
effect on political parties. 
Data regarding party 
affiliation or voting 
history may not be used in 
plan preparation 
Party registration and voting 
history data must be 
excluded from first phase of 
mapping process, but can be 
used to test maps for 
compliance with the stated 
criteria  
 
Consideration should 
not be given to the 
potential effect on 
political parties. Voter 
information can be used 
to ensure compliance to 
criteria only  
Incumbents Consideration should not 
be given to the potential 
effect on incumbents  
 
Commission cannot use 
information related to the 
incumbent’s residence or 
design districts to benefit 
incumbents  
 
Consideration should 
not be given to the 
potential effect on 
incumbents  
or other potential 
candidates  
Nesting  Yes  Yes  Yes   
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D. Transparency and Public Accountability 
 
 McCarthy I McCarthy II Ideal Plan  
Will Commission be 
governed by Bagley 
Keene Open Meeting 
Act? 
No  Yes Yes 
Are ex parte 
communications 
prohibited? 
No Yes, except between 
Commissioners and staff 
Yes, except between 
Commissioners and staff 
Are transcripts, data 
and documents 
required to be 
publicly available? 
Not mentioned Yes Yes; ex parte communications 
will be made public after Final 
Plan is proposed  
Public hearings 
requirements 
Public hearings must take place 
before and after a draft map is 
prepared, in a minimum of six 
different geographic areas 
around the state 
Public hearings must take 
place before and after a 
draft map is prepared, in a 
minimum of six different 
geographic areas around the 
state 
Public hearings must take place 
in several different geographic 
areas of the state both as part of 
the process of creating a draft 
map and in order to present and 
discuss draft maps 
Period to receive 
public comment 
Scheduled by Commission; no 
public comment planned after 
the Final Plan is adopted 
Before initial plan is 
developed or selected; after 
an initial plan is selected; at 
least 2 weeks after the initial 
plan is released for review; 
after significant changes.  
(Also, independent experts 
will evaluate criteria 
compliance)  
Before initial plan is drafted, 
including submission of partial or 
full map proposals; at least 2 
weeks after the initial plan; after 
significant changes; for 14 days 
on any Final Plan 
(Also, independent experts will 
evaluate criteria compliance 
during initial draft plan and after 
Final Plan is released)  
Involvement of 
interest groups  
Can propose plans to the 
Commission for consideration 
Can propose plans to the 
Commission for 
consideration 
To aid in determining 
communities of interest and 
maximize fair representation 
 
 
E. Procedures for Implementation and Review 
 
 McCarthy I McCarthy II Ideal Plan  
Gubernatorial veto  No No No  
Legislature votes No No No 
Citizens vote on each map 
of districts 
No No No 
Enactment time-table Immediately (mid-term 
2006) 
Immediately (mid-term 2006) After decennial census 
Appeal directly to the 
Supreme Court  
Yes Yes Yes 
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